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RACE AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A RALLYING-CRY FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Pace Jefferson McConkie*
In 1984, I came to this University's law school as a student desiring to
obtain a legal education that would serve as a foundation for a career in civil
rights advocacy, particularly in the realms of public education. It was my
intent that this legal education would naturally be heaped upon the ground-
work that had already been cultivated by my family, political, religious, and
general life's experience to that point. I had never suffered the direct
indignities of racial discrimination, but I was no less indignant by it. Utter
contempt and disdain for the stain of racism and racial inequality burned in
my veins. For reasons not to be fully discussed herein, but real and personal
to me, equaljustice under law and equal educational opportunity, in particular,
were driving forces in my own educational pursuits. Attending a law school
in the shadow of Little Rock Central High School meant something to me. It
still does. I felt as though I were a stakeholder in the Little Rock school
desegregation case long before I arrived in Arkansas.
In my third year of law school, I wrote a mock brief in John DiPippa's
civil rights seminar, representing the NAACP in a school desegregation case
based on materials provided in Derek Bell's treatise on Race, Racism and
American Law.' Four and one-half years later I was writing briefs for the
NAACP as a trial attorney in school desegregation cases in Florida, Georgia,
Delaware, Ohio, and Massachusetts.
I came to law school fully prepared to live out Charles Hamilton
Houston's directive that a lawyer is either a social engineer or he is a parasite
on society. Though I am certain that a handful of my professors would have
cringed at the thought, I am gratified that each and every one of them
contributed to my eventual abilities to practice law as Mr. Houston expected.
In 1986, I eagerly attended the Ben J. Altheimer Lecture Series to hear
from Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. In his voice was heard the promise of equal opportunity
* Legal Counsel, Maryland Higher Education Commission; Assistant Attorney General,
State of Maryland; B.A., University of Utah, 1984; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock
School of Law, 1987.
The author is a civil rights lawyer with a primary focus in the areas of constitutional law,
public education, and equal educational opportunity. Prior to his appointment with the State
of Maryland, he served with the National Litigation Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law and as an Assistant General Counsel with the NAACP. The views expressed
herein are solely his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Attorney General of
Maryland or any State agency.
1. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (Little Brown & Co.,
2d ed. 1980).
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and equal justice under law. To me Judge Higginbotham was, for our day, a
continuation of the long-line of superb legal scholars and advocates in the
tradition of Mr. Houston, Thurgood Marshall, James M. Nabritt, Jr.,
Constance Baker Motley, Wiley A. Branton (of this great State), Robert L.
Carter, William H. Hastie, Spotswood Robinson, 111, Louis L. Redding,
George E.C. Hayes, Jack Greenberg, Bernard G. Segal and Clarence M.
Mitchell to name only a few legal giants who inspire me. Judge
Higginbotham recently passed away, on December 14, 1998. He had written
earlier that year, partly in response to the political and judicial assault on
equal educational opportunity and affirmative action in higher education, as
evidenced by the Hopwood v. Texas 2 decision, among others: "[F]orty-seven
years ago, I witnessed the birth of racial justice in the Supreme Court and...
now, after forty-five years as a lawyer, judge, and law professor, I sometimes
feel as if I am watching justice die."3
When the preeminent constitutional scholars, jurists, and advocates of
our day talk like that, it is a very sobering signal. I am not naive as to the
political and judicial climate that prompted Judge Higginbotham's lament. I
have been a practitioner for only one-quarter of the expanse of his distin-
guished legal career, but that is long enough to fully understand the impact of
which he spoke. Still, I am reminded of the response of Thurgood Marshall,
reflecting upon the staggering legal battles of the civil rights movement,
stating simply that "we do the best we can with what we've got." With
respect to equal opportunity in higher education, we still have something: the
power of the law, coupled with the strength of morality, practicality, good
judgment, and common sense. It is imperative that we understand "what
we've got," and use it to get what we still need in this nation's long struggle
for racial equality and justice. That includes the possibility of race-based
measures necessary to ensure access and an opportunity to succeed for
qualified individuals who seek only to compete and excel on a level playing
field. It also includes a visionary reformation of continuing educational
practices necessary to eliminate institutional discrimination and inequality in
education.
I. ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates:
"[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
2. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
3. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Breaking ThurgoodMarshall's Promise, BLACKISSUES IN
HIGHER EDuC., Feb. 5, 1998, at 20.
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protection of the laws."4 In the realm of public education, this has been
repeatedly interpreted as meaning that an opportunity for education, "where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms."5 Subsequent desegregation and affirmative action cases
involving all levels of public education have not strayed from this founda-
tional principle.
While it may be a nuisance to the agenda of some, the Fourteenth
Amendment still applies to minorities in this country, and African Americans
are its principal intended beneficiaries. What was true in 1873 is true today.
Directly addressing the Civil War Amendments, the Supreme Court ruled:
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no
one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would
have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.6
The Fourteenth Amendment is a race-based remedy. Incredibly, I sometimes
wonder whether it would pass constitutional muster in certain judicial
jurisdictions today. Even with a generous spirit and lending all the respect
that is due the opponents of affirmative action, I cannot concede that the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates their definition of "a color-blind society"
or even that their motives to completely remove race from consideration in,
for example, college admissions are free from race as an underlying factor.
To paraphrase the distinguished former Senator Dale Bumpers from this State:
"When somebody tells you its not about race, its about race." It is about race,
and the constitutional protections specifically adopted for African Americans
must not be diminished in the raging debate.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also requires that "[n]o person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."7 This applies to any public or private recipient of federal aid and
prohibits intentional discrimination and, by virtue of its implementing
regulations, policies or practices which have a discriminatory impact or effect.
Moreover, with respect to diversity and affirmative action, the Supreme Court
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
6. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1973).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1996).
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has determined that Title VI does not bar affirmative action that satisfies
constitutional standards, including non-remedial affirmative action in
decisions affecting students in higher education! As a result, regulations
implementing Title VI support voluntary efforts to create racial diversity in
educational programs, even in the absence of a finding) of prior
discrimination.9
For states which have operated education systems with a history of de
jure, or official, segregation and discrimination, there are additional
obligations. Primarily, these states, must act to completely dismantle their
dual systems, eliminate the vestiges or present effects of segregation to the
extent practicable, and ensure that the principal wrong of the de jure
system-the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the
violation-are no longer present.'0 This appropriately includes, where
necessary, the formulation of "new and further remedies" to insure full
compliance with the command of the Constitution." In United States v.
Fordice, the leading higher education case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
a state has an "affirmative duty" to dismantle its discriminatory system and to
eliminate "to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational
practices [those] policies and practices traceable to its prior system that
continue to have segregative effects."' 2 Significantly, it is clear from this and
other decisions that race-neutral policies and practices are not sufficient and
that the state must take affirmative measures to remedy the constitutional
violation. 3 This extends to all policies and practices traceable to a prior
system of segregation and to any present or continuing policies and practices
that foster discrimination or perpetuate conditions that are indicative of the
prior dual system.'4
Additional obligations are also often imposed by state law. In Maryland,
for example, the Charter for Higher Education provides that "[p]ublic higher
education should be accessible to all those who seek and qualify for admis-
sion,""5 and requires each institution to ensure that women and minorities are
8. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992); Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). See also Bakke, 438
U.S. at 328 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
9. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii) (1996); 34 C.F.R. § 100.5(l) (1996); 34 C.F.R. § 280.1
(1996); 20 U.S.C. § 7202, 7205 (West Supp. 1997).
10. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-90 (1992).
11. See id. at 492.
12. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 728-29, 731-33.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 731-33; Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1979);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61 (1979).
15. 15 MD. CODE ANN., Education § 10-202(2) (1998).
[Vol. 21
HIGHER EDUCATION
"equitably represented... so that the higher education community reflects the
diversity of the State's population."' 6  The Maryland Higher Education
Commission is specifically responsible for "[d]eveloping a program of
desegregation and equal educational opportunity, including an enhancement
plan, for historically African American colleges and universities" and
"[m]onitoring the progress made under, and assuring compliance with, the
goals, measures, and commitments contained in the desegregation and equal
education opportunity plan."' 7
Moreover, the State must comply with a formal plan submitted to the
United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, pursuant to
its obligations under Title VI.' The principal objectives of this plan are (1)
the continued integration of Maryland's traditionally white institutions
through a portfolio of enrollment goals, recruitment measures, retention
efforts and affirmative action plans, and (2) the enhancement of Maryland's
historically black institutions to ensure that they are comparable and
competitive with the historically white institutions with respect to capital
facilities, operating budgets and new academic programs.
Recent developments in the law have neither replaced nor diminished
these legal obligations. Rather, the judiciary has acted to narrow the
framework within which the state can act to remedy the effects of discrimina-
tion or to pursue the benefits of diversity in higher education. In doing so, it
has clearly established that the use of race or of race-conscious programs is
subject to strict scrutiny, the most rigorous constitutional standard of review.
All race-conscious policies or practices must serve a "compelling state
interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to further that compelling interest. 9
Factors in considering whether a policy or practice is "narrowly tailored" to
further a compelling interest include (a) necessity for the policy or practice
and the efficacy of alternative remedies, (b) flexibility and duration of the
policy or practice, (c) the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor
market, pool of students, etc., and (d) the impact on the rights of third
parties.20
In the realm of higher education, the courts currently recognize two
governmental interests as "compelling" under the strict scrutiny standard:
16. MD. CODE ANN., Education § 10-204(8) (1998).
17. MD. CODE ANN., Education § 11-105(e)(1)(i)-(ii) (1998).
18. See MARYLAND STATE BOARD FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, A PLAN TO ASSURE EQUAL
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1985) ("OCR Plan").
19. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
20. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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curing the present effects of identified past discrimination in a system of
education and fostering or achieving a diverse student body on college
campuses. Outside of the Fifth Circuit, both interests retain some vitality.
Remedies for the present effects of past discrimination have certainly been
narrowed by such rulings as Podberesky v. Kirwan21 involving a scholarship
program at the University of Maryland, and it is certain that the diversity
rationale will soon meet its Maker for an accounting. Still, properly fashioned
race-based policies and programs remain lawful under the Constitution and
Title VI.
In Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion establishes that even in the absence
of past discrimination against a certain minority group, the "attainment of a
diverse student body... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education [which] legitimately may be served by a
properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration
of race and ethnic origin. 22 Pursuant to such a program, race may be one of
many "plus" factors, but it may not be the only factor. In turn, race may not
be used to separate or insulate a minority applicant from competition with
other applicants.23
Unless properly justifiable for a remedial purpose, it seems clear under
Bakke that race-exclusive programs will not be upheld under the diversity
rationale. However, as long as race is used as one of many "plus" factors and
does not preclude all applicants from competing in a single pool, the
"narrowly tailored" factor of strict scrutiny will likely be satisfied. It should
also be emphasized that in Bakke, the determination that educational diversity
is a compelling state interest is based on an institution's First Amendment
freedom "to make its own judgments as to education" as opposed to any
burden to establish, with empirical data or otherwise, the conclusive
educational benefits of a diverse student body (though research and data in
this respect will have great value).24 This provides very helpful guidance to
an institution attempting to craft a lawful affirmative action program to foster
diversity.
Podberesky is indicative of the increasing difficulty of meeting the strict
scrutiny standard of review. First, the race-exclusive Banneker scholarship
program at issue was implemented pursuant to the approved OCR plan as an
affirmative action program necessary to remedy the present effects of past
segregation and discrimination. Even though the program was defended as
necessary to meet the OCR standard for Title VI compliance, and, in fact,
21. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
22. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
23. See id. at 311-12, 316-20.
24. See id. at 312-13.
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satisfied OCR, it did not satisfy judicial review under strict scrutiny. Second,
the program was invalidated even in the face of a comprehensive record
containing extensive administrative and judicial findings of present effects of
past discrimination at the University of Maryland. A "strong basis in
evidence" that the university had (a) a poor reputation in the African
American community, (b) under-representation of African Americans in its
student body, (c) a disproportionately low retention and graduation rate of
African American students, and (d) a hostile racial climate on campus was
insufficient to justify a race-exclusive measure under strict scrutiny.25
It is important to be reminded of the reach of Podberesky in considering
other programs designed to enhance equal educational opportunity for
minority students. While there was sufficient evidence of past discrimination
in that case, there was not a sufficient showing, according to the Fourth
Circuit, of present effects of that past discrimination, primarily because the
findings were too remote in time and were not shown to be directly connected
to conduct of the institution itself. Among other things, the court of appeals
ruled that mere knowledge of historical facts is insufficient to connect present
effects with past discrimination and that a race-exclusive measure cannot be
used as a remedy for general societal discrimination. The court of appeals
then held that even if it had been proven that the program was necessary to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination, it was not narrowly tailored
to further that objective.
Podberesky does not establish that race-based or even race-exclusive
measures cannot be implemented by a university. Those measures will be
upheld if proven necessary to remedy the present effects of past discrimina-
tion-a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny analysis-and if they are
narrowly tailored to further that purpose. As demonstrated, this is a difficult
task, even in light of the dictum that strict scrutiny should not mean "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact."26 The diversity rationale was not a meaningful factor
in Podberesky because, as the court of appeals determined, the Banneker
program was not established to increase diversity but rather as a desegregation
measure to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. It was also
determined that race-exclusive programs were not subject to the Bakke
analysis allowing for race to be considered as a "plus factor" among many in
college admissions.27
25. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
26. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
27. But see Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assoc., 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir.
1993) (a non-education case where a race-based promotion policy to achieve diversity in a city's
police department was held invalid because, in substantial part, the city did not provide
sufficient evidence that racial diversity is essential to effective law enforcement and constitutes
1999]
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The more troubling opinion, of course, was rendered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1996, affecting colleges and
universities in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi only.2 With complete
disregard for Bakke as the controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court of
appeals categorically rejected diversity as a compelling interest and ruled that
race cannot be considered as a factor in college admissions. While it was
determined that race cannot be used as a proxy for other factors, the court
acknowledged that race-neutral factors that may have a disproportionate
impact on or for certain racial groups are permissible so long as there is no
intent to discriminate. It also reasoned that remedying the present effects of
past discrimination may be a compelling interest, but only for discrimination
by the governmental unit or actor involved, and only for present effects that
are causally related to that discrimination. Like Podberesky, the court ruled
that there is no compelling interest in remedying the present effects of general
societal discrimination. Because the compelling interest prong of strict
scrutiny was not satisfied, the court did not reach the issue whether the
affirmative action program was narrowly tailored.
It is interesting to note that in a decision rendered late last year by a
federal district court in Maryland, diversity was found to be a compelling
governmental interest for the purposes of strict scrutiny. The case involves
review ofthe Montgomery County Public Schools' use of a "diversity profile"
with regard to requests for student transfers among its schools. The school
district (53.4% White, 20.3% African American, 13.2% Hispanic, and 12.7%
Asian in its student body) uses the profile to avoid inadvertently creating
segregated schools and because of its "profound interest in maintaining a
diverse school system." In upholding the denial of a transfer request, the court
rejected the Hopwood rationale and ruled that "the diversity interest remains
a compelling governmental interest in the context now being considered."29
An appeal is pending.
Other courts have been careful not to follow the Hopwood court's
disregard for Bakke. In the current litigation involving admission practices at
the University of Washington Law School, U.S. District Judge Thomas S.
Zilly ruled that Bakke is still "good law" and that the case would proceed
under the standard that "educational diversity is a constitutionally permissible
a compelling state interest). This does not, however, diminish the ruling in Bakke that diversity
is a compelling interest in college admissions based upon an institution's First Amendment
rights.
28. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
29. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,453 (D. Md. 1998).
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goal for an institution of higher education," emphasizing that race-conscious
programs will be subjected to the "most exacting scrutiny possible."3
In October 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld the consideration of "durational residency" as a factor in medical
school admissions at the University of New Mexico. In doing so, the court
applied the Bakke analysis, even though this was not a case addressing the
consideration of race or ethnicity. The court reasoned that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke "affirms the constitutional power of Federal and State
Governments to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all,"'" and
held that "[d]espite the absence of a clear majority opinion, Bakke remains the
leading jurisprudential authority in this area."32
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated a
policy governing the admission of students to the prestigious public Boston
Latin School after analyzing-under the strict scrutiny standard-both the
diversity rationale advanced by the public school system and the asserted need
to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. Still, the court proceeded
on the foundation "that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of
'diversity' might be sufficiently compelling, in specific circumstances, to
justify race-conscious actions."33
There remains considerable room for policies and practices which, when
properly crafted, fall within the current legal framework governing diversity
and affirmative action. It is emphasized that institutions of higher education
should clearly articulate their lawful objectives and justification for any
program that is race-based or which considers race as a factor among many.
In turn, "narrow tailoring" is a continual process and an institution should
always be aware of its diversity related needs and assess what has been
accomplished and what still needs to be accomplished. Where race-neutral
measures will, in reality, meet the objectives, such measures should be
pursued. Otherwise, a narrowly tailored use of race, where necessary, should
not be avoided or abandoned. Finally, it is suggested that any program that
satisfies the applicable legal standard can also be defended politically. Thus,
carefully crafted programs should not be disregarded or avoided in the face of
political challenges.
It is also clear that various means to enhance access to higher education
remain significantly undeveloped, such as meaningful and effective recruit-
30. See Smith v. Univeristy of Washington Law School, No. C-97-335Z (W.D. Wash. Feb.
12, 1999) (order).
31. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Buchwald v. University of New Mexico Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 499 (10th Cir.
1998).
33. Wessmann v. Boston School Committee, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998).
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ment and outreach programs among inner city schools, under-represented
populations, the rural poor, and other socioeconomically disadvantaged
communities. In Texas, for example, the state at least responded to Hopwood
in some fashion by passing legislation that would ensure that a student who
graduated in the top 10% of his or her high school class anywhere in the state
could be admitted to public colleges and universities in Texas. In addition,
institutions of higher education in that state are now considering such race-
neutral factors as the educational level of an applicant's parents and
grandparents, community of the applicant, high school district, geography,
income, family income, wealth, employment of parents and grandparents,
subsidized housing, home value, number of siblings, subsidized lunches,
English as a second language, medically underserved areas, percentage of
college expenses earned, unique cultural and social experience, age, and
second careers.34
I. EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES
To borrow a phrase from The Education Trust, "College begins in
kindergarten."" Access to higher education cannot adequately be addressed
while ignoring the pernicious educational practices that leave all too many
disadvantaged and minority students on a track that ends long before the
dream of college even begins.
Earlier this month, a class-action lawsuit was filed by eight minority
college students and a handful of civil rights organizations against the
University of California at Berkeley on grounds that the institution's
admissions policy for freshmen has an unjustified effect of denying admission
to a disproportionate number of qualified, high-achieving applicants from
those minority groups.36 In large part, the plaintiffs assert that by placing
greater emphasis on SAT scores and giving "bonus points" to students who
have taken Advanced Placement courses and exams, the institution fails to
fully and fairly consider minority applicants who often do not have access to
test-taking preparation or to Advanced Placement classes at their high schools.
34. Billy R. Ballard, Associate Dean and Associate Vice-President for Student Affairs and
Admissions, University of Texas-Galveston Medical Branch, Remarks at the University of
Pennsylvania (Oct. 21, 1998), (A Technical Assistance Workshop on College Admissions and
Affirmative Action: Maintaining Legally Sound Institutional Policies, Programs and
Administrative Practices).
35. The Education Trust is a non-profit, non-partisan organization created to promote high
academic achievement for all students at all levels, kindergarten through college. It is
headquartered in Washington, D.C.
36. See Rios v. Regents of the University of California, No. CV99-0525 SI (N.D. Cal. filed
Feb. 2, 1999).
[Vol. 21
HIGHER EDUCATION
Last fall, over 750 African American, Latino and Filipino American applicants
who had grade-point averages of at least 4.0 were denied admission under the
policy. I call this lawsuit a good start at addressing only one of the core
problems.
The Southern Education Foundation Maryland Leadership Group
recently documented that: 62% of the- African American ninth graders in
Maryland high schools in 1992 graduated from high school four years later;
only 53% of those students enrolled in higher education institutions; 57% of
those students enrolled in community colleges; 19% of those students
graduated or transferred to a four-year institution within four years; and 33%
of those students will graduate with a baccalaureate degree." Following these
and other startling findings, the Group filed recommendations addressing
college readiness and teacher preparation, citing curriculum quality and
intensity as the most important pre-college variable determining access to and
success in higher education.38
Judge Robert L. Carter has taught, and I have learned by experience, that
the struggle for equal educational opportunity has not advanced as it might
have in part because educators have not defined a workable definition of the
term as an educational concept or refined it as educational policy and applied
methodology. Lawyers must cast the term in its legal and constitutional
dimensions, but the responsibility for embellishing the term as a positive
educational criterion rests with the educators and policymakers. Once that is
done-more adequately than it has been to date--courts will be able to
incorporate it into a framework of the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. Otherwise, courts will, as they have for the most part up to now,
avoid coming to grips with the issue.39
This presents the challenge of greatest importance, elimination of a two-
tiered system of education-one for minority students and a higher level for
others. It requires the dismantling of destructive educational policies and
practices which, in a very real and literal way, short-change or limit the
academic progress of a child and the establishment of teaching methodologies
which are grounded in a curriculum of rigorous and demanding intellectual
content and based on the foundation that all children can learn and are
expected to do so. When fortified by the power of content, precision, and
clarity placed by educators on the concept of equal educational opportunity,
37. See SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION MARYLAND LEADERSHIP GROUP, MiLES To
Go IN MARYLAND: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY, ENSURING ECONOMIC GROWTH (Jan.
14, 1999).
38. See id. at 18.
39. See Robert L. Carter, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr. Memorial
Lecture Luncheon (July 9, 1993).
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legal strategies rise to a new level in persuading courts to make them part of
the constitutional Equal Protection Doctrine.'
In a suburban Pittsburgh school district, the plaintiff class of African
American children have had some success in doing just that. Pursuant to its
obligations under a long-standing desegregation decree,4' the school system
was recently ordered to dismantle segregated classrooms within its schools by
abolishing the academic "tracking" of children based upon the practice of
grouping them by perceived abilities and requiring the delivery of a rede-
signed curriculum of problem solving and higher order thinking skills to all
children in heterogeneously grouped classrooms. The remedy also calls for
extensive teacher development to ensure that the curriculum is effectively
taught in such heterogeneous classrooms with high expectations for all
children.42
The practice of ability grouping or tracking of students is an especially
egregious practice that permeates the vast majority of school districts across
the country, perpetuates segregation within schools, fosters discrimination,
and results in significant limitations on the opportunity for minority children
to progress academically or prepare for higher education. Normally, it is the
practice of separating students based on perceived abilities that are determined
at a very early age by standardized testing and less formal teacher assess-
ments. Once a child is placed in a high, average, or low-achieving group, the
child will generally follow a corresponding curriculum track through
elementary and secondary school, with little or no chance of breaking-out of
one group and being placed in another. Simply put, a child placed in a lower-
level group is generally sunk, and will likely remain in that group in all core-
curriculum classes in all grades, being denied the opportunity to participate in
college-bound courses, having been relegated to a curriculum of rote repetition
and limited problem solving or thinking skills.
In the metropolitan Wilmington, Delaware school desegregation case, we
were unsuccessful in obtaining a remedy for such practices, despite meticu-
lous expert testimony and evidence that went undisputed and actual findings
in the record.4" The results of such practices were astoundingly disturbing.
For example: (1) all four school districts tended to place students at the same
"ability level" for classes in a variety of subject areas, and to lock students
40. See id.
41. See generally Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340 (3rd Cir. 1978).
42. See Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 71-538 (W.D. Pa.) (unpublished
orders).
43. See Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784 (D. Del.
1995), affd, 90 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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into the same or lower ability level placement from year to year; (2) White
students were consistently over-represented, and African American students
were consistently under-represented in high ability classes in all subjects and,
in contrast, African American students were consistently over-represented
while White students were consistently under-represented in low ability tracks
in all subjects; (3) the districts did not attempt to justify their tracking
practices on educational grounds and the practices were not representative of
what tracking advocates claimed as a trustworthy enactment of a theory of
tracking and ability grouping; (4) as a group, African American children
scored lower than White children on achievement tests, yet African American
children were much less likely than White children with the same test scores
to be placed in college preparatory and advanced courses; and (5) lower track
classes provided African American children with lower expectations from
teachers and less access to the whole range of resources and opportunities,
including curriculum, instructional approaches, and classroom environments
conducive to learning and courses that would qualify them for college."
The persistent racial gap in academic achievement and related education
indicators resulting from such practices should surprise no one and should
infuriate everyone. Even more repugnant is the continuing response of school
systems which, even in the face of compelling evidence establishing such
practices, assert that racial disparities in academic achievement are beyond
their control, thereby justifying their failure to provide scores of disadvan-
taged and minority students any real opportunity for academic advancement.
These are exemplary of the conditions that cannot remain unchallenged
and which must be resolved if the 21 st Century is to provide any sense of
equal educational opportunity for children who can now scarcely imagine the
excitement of high academic expectation and the hope that can only be born
of access to a quality higher education where they can compete on a level
playing field. Policymakers, educators, lawyers,judges, parents, and students
all have a distinct role to play. Institutions of higher education, in particular,
need to rise to new heights and ensure necessary reform in educational
strategies and methodologies, curriculum redesign, and teacher preparation in
order for this to happen.
44. See id. (citing DR. JEANNE OAKES, ABILrY GROUPING, TRACKINGAND WITHIN-SCHOOL
SEGREGATION IN NEW CASTLE COUNTY SCHOOLS, A REPORT TO THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE (1995)).
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III. CONCLUSION
A few months after Hopwood was decided, Judge Higginbotham
underwent the first of three open-heart surgeries. He described how late each
evening, after his family and friends had left, he would slip in and out of
consciousness and dream of a sign he saw long ago on a rickety cab in Lagos,
Nigeria. The sign read, in big, bold letters: NO MORE TIME FOR
FOOLISHNESS. His own words say it best:
The long winter ended, the spring rains came, and I got better. But
still that sign haunted my dreams. As I returned to the work to which I had
dedicated my career, I began to understand-slowly and then clearly--the
meaning that sign held for me.
At times, this country seems intent on returning to the foolishness of
the past ....
It has been a long while since that spring afternoon in 1950 when, as
a first-year Yale law student, I heard the promise of freedom in the voice
of Thurgood Marshall. Since then, I have observed commendable
progress, lately some tragic retrogression, and now I see even more clearly
that, in the long, bloody history of race relations in America, there is no
more time for foolishness."'
As we bridge the centuries, let that be the rallying-cry for racial justice and
equal educational opportunity.
45. Higginbotham, supra note 3, at 22-23.
[Vol. 21
